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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an interlocutory appeal from a discovery order
entered by the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Third Judicial District
Court of Tooele County.

The district court ruled that a letter

dated June 11, 1985 was privileged and need not be produced.
This Court

granted

petitioner

Gold Standard,

Inc. (hereafter

"Gold Standard") permission to appeal the district court's order
pursuant to Rule 5, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
The respondents on appeal are as follows:
Barrick

Resources

Corporation,

Barrick

Resources

American

(USA) Inc.,

Texaco, Inc., Getty Oil Company and Getty Mining Company (hereafter "Barrick/Getty").

For the purposes of this appeal, the term

"Barrick" shall refer to the two Barrick entities and the term
"Getty" shall refer to the two Getty entities.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue that Gold Standard presents in its opening
brief is premised on factual mischaracterizations that are not
supported by the record.

Simply stated, the proper

issue on

appeal is:
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it determined that the June 11,
1985 letter, which is in the nature of a
retainer agreement and contains confidential
communications, is protected by the attorneyclient and work product privileges?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 78-24-8 Privileged Communications.
icy

of

There are particular relations in which it is the polthe law to encourage confidence and to preserve it
-1-

inviolate. Therefore, a person cannot be examined as a witness
in the following cases:
*

*

*

(2) An attorney cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client to him, or
his advice given therein, in th£ course of
professional
employment;
nor
can
an
1
attorney s secretary, stenographe: or clerk
be examined, without the consent of his
employer, concerning any fact, the knowledge
of which has been acquired in such capacity.
Rule 26(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Trial preparation: Materiali.
Subject
to the provisions of Subdivision (b)(4) of
this rule, a party may obtain discovery of
documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under Subdivision (b)(1) of this
rule and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or
by or for that other party's representative
(including his attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has
substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of his case and that he is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been made,
the court shall protect against disclosure of
the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or
other representative of a party concerning
the litigation.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
In December,

1986, Gold

Standard

filed

a

lawsuit

against various entities including, but not limited to the parties to this appeal.

Since that time, a missive amount of dis-

covery has taken place including the production of over one hundred thousand pages of documents by Barrick/Getty.

-2-

There are 170

volumes

of

deposition

testimony

and

the

district

court

has

resolved numerous discovery motions during the past three years.
On May 10, 1989, Gold Standard filed its motion to compel production of the particular document that is the subject of
this appeal, a June 11, 1985 letter addressed to Parsons, Behle &
Latimer

and signed

in counterparts by Texaco,

Inc., Getty Oil

Company, Getty Mining Company, Getty Gold Mine Company, Barrick
Petroleum (USA) Inc. and Barrick Resources Corporation (hereafter
"June 11 letter").

In the memorandum in support of its motion,

Gold Standard argued that the document contains terms regarding
the sale of Getty's interest in the Mercur Mine to Barrick and,
therefore, is not protected by either the attorney-client or the
work product privileges.

Record at 4283.

In its memorandum

in opposition to plaintiff's motion

to compel, Barrick argued that the document was protected by the
attorney-client privilege and work product immunity and that Gold
Standard had failed to demonstrate both that it had substantial
need of the materials in the preparation of its case and that it
was unable, without

undue hardship,

to obtain

equivalent of the materials by other means.

the substantial

Both criteria are

required by the exception to work product protection contained in
Rule 26(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Barrick submitted

the June 11 letter to the district court for jLn camera review.
Barrick

also

submitted

an

Affidavit

of

Patrick

J.

Garver,

Barrick1s counsel, in support of its position that the document
was

prepared

in

anticipation

-3-

of

litigation,

contained

confidential communications concerning legal advice, and that the
parties who signed the document formulated steps to ensure that
the

document

remained

confidential.

included in Appendix as Item "1").
pleading

in

opposition

to

Gold

Record

at

4322

(copy

Getty and Texaco also filed a
Standard's

motion

to

compel.

Record at 4346.
After an iji camera review of the document and consideration of both the legal memoranda filed by the parties and the
oral arguments of counsel, Judge Frank G. Noel entered a minute
entry on July 28, 1989 stating that,

ff

[t]he Court is of the opin-

ion that the agreement of June 11, 1985 is privileged and therefore denies
(copy

[plaintiff's] motion

included

in Appendix

as

to

Item

compel.11
"2"),

Record
The order

at

4754

denying

plaintiff's motion to compel and making the sealed copy of the
document a part of the record on appeal was entered on August 14,
1989.

Record at 4937 (copy included in Appendix as Item " 3 " ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court has broad power to determine whether

a document is privileged.

Its finding will be overturned only if

it is clearly erroneous.

After an in camera review of the docu-

ment, the district court correctly ruled that the June 11 letter
is privileged.

Although

the document

is

in the nature

of a

retainer agreement, its terms go beyond that type of agreement.
The June 11 letter contains confidential communications that are
protected

from discovery by the attorney-client privilege.

In

addition, the document was prepared in anticipation of litigation

-4-

and contains legal observations and conclusions.

Therefore, it

is work product, as well.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
in the more than three years that this case has been
proceeding toward trial, the district court has presided over and
managed discovery while hearing and ruling on several substantive
motions,

in the process, the court has acquired a working knowl-

edge of the complex facts and procedural background of this case.
A

lower

court's

erroneous.

finding

should

be overturned

only

if clearly

E.g., United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509 (1st Cir.

1986).
ARGUMENT
I.
The inquiry that
appeal

INTRODUCTION
is required to resolve the issue on

imposes constraints on both parties.

Barrick/Getty

is

unable to discuss the June 11 letter in detail without disclosing
its contents and possibly waiving the privileges afforded to the
document.

Understandably, Gold Standard must speculate as to the

document's contents because Gold Standard has never seen it.

As

is common in this type of matter, and as occurred at the district
court

level, Barrick has submitted the June 11 letter to this

Court

for

appeal.

in

camera

inspection

in connection with

the present

See Parker v. Kitzhaber, No. 88-1089-JU (D. Or. June 8,

1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. File) (district court ordered
party

to submit

retainer

agreements

under

seal

review) (copy included in Appendix as Item "4").
-5-

for jji camera

In an attempt

to balance

effective

advocacy

and the

risk of waiver, Barrick/Getty will discuss the nature of the document without discussing its specific contents.
ter cannot

readily be classified

The June 11 let-

or categorized.

It contains

elements of a retainer agreement, but its terms go beyond those
of a standard retainer agreement.
its in camera

inspection, the document

that

are privileged,

that

are work product.

paragraph

As the cpurt will discern from

that

contains

as well as, observations

might

communications
and

conclusions

The June 11 letter also contains one
possibly

be

characterized

as

"transac-

tional," but that paragraph is not directed at effectuating the
June 1985 sale of the Mercur Mine, as Gold Standard speculates,
but rather, is conditional and focuses on future events.
importantly,

the

paragraph

is

inextricably

bound

up with

More
the

attorney-client relationship.
Gold Standard speculates that the agreement may contain
indemnity terms.
document

is at

It does not.
the heart

of

Gold Standard argues that the

the questions of title, property

rights, breach of fiduciary and contractual obligations, and conspiracy.
II.

It is not.
THE DOCUMENT IS PROTECTED FROM DISCOVERY BY
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE ANt> THE WORK
PRODUCT DOCTRINE.
A.

The Attorney-Client Privilege Promotes Broad Public Interests.

It is well settled that the attorney-client privilege
provides protection

from disclosure of confidential

communica-

tions that are made between client and lawyer in the course of
-6-

providing legal advice of any kind to the client.

See, e.g., J.

Wigmore, 8 Wiqmore on Evidence S 2292, p. 554 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961).
privileges
law.

The attorney-client privilege
for confidential

communications

is the oldest of the
known to the common

Its purpose is to encourage full and frank

communication

between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader
public interests in the observance of law and administration of
justice.

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
B.

The Work Product Doctrine Is Well Recognized Under
Utah Law And Protects Materials Prepared In Anticipation Of Litigation.

The work product doctrine protects material prepared in
anticipation of litigation from compelled disclosure.
trine was first recognized
(1947),

and

has been

in Hickman v. Taylor,

codified

and

broadened

26(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The doc-

329 U.S. 495

in Utah

by

Rule

The rule states in per-

tinent part:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents
and tangible things otherwise discoverable
under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial by or for another party or by or for
that party's representative (including his
attorney,
consultant,
surety,
indemnitor,
insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that
the party seeking discovery has substantial
need of the materials in the preparation of
his case and that he is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent
or the materials by other means.
(Emphas i s added.)
Documents are protected by the work product doctrine if
they have been prepared

by or for a party or by or

-7-

for that

party's representative

in anticipation of litigation.

See Rule

26(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; City Consumer Services,
Inc. v. H o m e , 100 F.R.D. 740, 747 (D. Utah 1983).

The rationale

for the doctrine is that it is unfair to allow parties to avail
themselves of an opposing lawyer's work product.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that, "litigation need not necessarily be imminent
. . . as long as the primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document was to aid in possible future litigation."
United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d
cert, denied,

454 U.S. 862

1028, 1040

(1981); Osterneck

(5th Cir. 1981),
v. E.T. Barwick

Industries, Inc. , 82 F.R.D. 81, 87 (N.D. Ga. 1979) citing 8 C.
Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2024, at
p. 198 (1970).

From a review of the document itself it is appar-

ent that the June 11 letter was prepared in anticipation of this
very litigation.
C.

The Document Fulfills The Requirements For Protection Pursuant To Both The Attorney-Client Privilege And The Work Product Doctrine.
1.

The document contains confidential communications
that
are
protected
by
the
attorney-client privileg^.

As stated above, the terms of the document go beyond
those of a retainer agreement.

The June 11 letter sets forth the

substance of confidential discussions between clients and counsel
relating to legal advice.

Record at 4322.

As the Court will see

from its jji camera inspection, the document contains confidential

-8-

communications

that

are

protected

by

the

attorney-client

privilege.
2.

The
prepared

The document was prepared in anticipation of
litigation and is protected by the work product doctrine.

record demonstrates

that

the June

11

letter was

in anticipation of litigation with the involvement of

counsel for Barrick/Getty.
Standard makes no claim

Record at 4322.

that

Additionally, Gold

Barrick/Getty did

litigation at the time the document was created.

not

anticipate

As the Court

will see from its jji camera review, the letter contains observations and conclusions, was prepared in anticipation of this very
litigation and, is therefore, protected from discovery.
D.

When Confidential Communications Are Contained In
A Retainer Agreement They Are Protected From
Discovery.

Barrick does not quarrel with Gold Standard's position
that the external trappings of the attorney-client relationship,
such as the existence of the relationship, the fees paid and the
basic terms of the attorney's employment, are not protected from
discovery.

That argument does not apply to the June 11 letter,

however, because

the terms of

the

letter go beyond

facts of the attorney-client relationship.

the basic

Indeed, the document

contains privileged confidential communications.
Confidential communications within retainer agreements
are protected by the courts pursuant to the attorney-client privilege.

See Parker v. Kitzhaber, No. 88-1089-JU (D. Or. June 8,

1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file); Cf. United States v.

-9-

Liebman, 742 F.2d 807 (3rd Cir. 1984) (a substantial confidential
communication was privileged when the communication was disclosed
during

the

act

Litigation,

of

retaining

89 F.R.D.

595f

603

a

lawyer);

In

re

(N.D. Tex. 1981)

Securities

(rejecting a

claim of attorney-client privilege because request did not seek
confidential

matters);

J.

Gergacz,

Attorney-Corporate

Client

Privilege, at 3-35 (1987) (disclosure of factual circumstances of
attorney-client relationship may be privileged if they reveal or
threaten to reveal the substance of attorneys-client confidences).
In

the

recent

case

of

Parker

v.

Kitzhaber,

the

plaintiff sought a copy of all retainer agreements between a law
firm and its client.

The United States District Court for the

District of Oregon ruled that the attorney-client privilege did
not apply to the names, addresses, telephone numbers and dates of
contacts

with

client

attorney-client

representatives,

pointing

privilege does not cover

out

that

the

issues related to the

creation or existence of the attorney-client relationship (which
are

not

at

documents
covered

issue

may
by

the

here).

contain

However,
confidential

attorney-client

the

court

noted

communications

privilege.

Id.

at

that

the

that

are

2

(copy

included in Appendix as Item " 4 " ) .
During

Robert

McConnell's

deposition,

Gold

Standard

itself argued this position and refused to disclose the terms of
its

own

engagement

of

attorney-client privilege.

counsel

on

the

grounds

of

the

See Deposition of Robert McConnell,

-10-

p. 336 (a copy of the relevant page is included in Appendix as
Item " 5 " ) .
The document contains confidential communications that
are privileged and concern legal advice.

Record at 4320.

above discussion points out, privileged confidential

As the

communica-

tions are protected regardless of whether they are contained in a
retainer

agreement.

The

confidential

communications

in

the

June 11 letter are protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege.
E.

The Document Is Not An Arms-Length Commercial
Agreement, Rather, It Is A Joint Communication To
Counsel For The Parties Relating To Potential Litigation.

In its brief, Gold Standard argues that the respondents
could not have a legally protectable expectation of confidentiality in executing an agreement
commercial transaction.

that was part of an arms-length

Opening brief at 10.

The June 11 letter

is not directed at effectuating the June 1985 sale of the company
that owned the Mercur Mine.

Rather, the document is conditional

and focuses on contingencies in the event of litigation which was
threatened by Gold Standard.
Additionally, the signators to the document were made
aware that the document was to be treated as privileged and kept
confidential.

Record at 4322.

An _in camera review of the docu-

ment will disclose provisions that were formulated to help preserve

the

document's

confidentiality.

Indeed,

Gold

Standard

cites no evidence of waiver in the voluminous record below.

-11-

In

fact, there is none.

The privileges attached

to the document

have been protected.
F.

The Document Was Addressed To Counsel And Was Created With Counsel's Assistance, Not Merely w Funnel edw To Counsel, Making Jackson v. Kennecott
Inapplicable To This Case.

In the opening paragraph of its brief, Gold Standard
argues that the Utah Supreme Court previously decided the issue
raised by this appeal in Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp.f 495
P.2d 1254 (Utah 1972).

Gold Standard cites Jackson for the prop-

osition that when presented with the question of whether particular documents were privileged, this Court
privilege

and

'funneled1

protection

to counsel."

because

the

"rejected a claim of

[doctuments

were] merely

Opening brief at p. 9.

In this case,

the document was not "funneled" to a lawyer who had no hand in
the creation of the document, as occurred in Jackson.
the June 11 letter
counsel

for

the

Rather,

is a communication addressed to counsel and

signators

was

involved

in

its

preparation.

Record at 4322.
Unlike

Jackson,

in which

the

documents

sought

were

highly factual and contained mostly raw data, this case involves
a

letter

to counsel

that

between counsel and client.
factual information.

contains

confidential

communications

The document contains virtually no

Moreover, in Jackson, tfie defendant did not

anticipate specific litigation, whereas, in this case, the parties to the document were aware of both Gold Standard's identity
and the specific claims that Gold Standard might bring.

That

awareness became a reality in December, 1986 when Gold Standard
-12-

filed this lawsuit against the parties to the document.

Record

at 36,
In Jackson, Kennecott's counsel was not involved in the
actual drafting of the documents, but merely had requested that a
series
data,

of
be

potentially
forwarded

damaging

to

him.

documents,
In

containing

contrast,

counsel

factual
for

the

signators of the June 11 letter was involved in the drafting of
the document, which contains the substance of discussions relating to legal advice.
the

instant

Record at 4322.

Jackson does not apply to

facts and therefore, does not

resolve

any of

the

issues raised by this appeal.
III.

THE JUNE 11 LETTER WAS NOT DIRECTED AT THE
JUNE 1985 SALE OF THE GETTY GOLD MINE COMPANY
BUT AT CONTINGENCIES THAT MIGHT RESULT FROM
FUTURE LITIGATION.
Throughout

its brief, Gold Standard's recurring

is that Barrick has somehow admitted that the document
and parcel" of the sale of the Mercur Mine.
Barrick has never made such an admission.

theme

is "part

As a matter of fact,

Out of an abundance of

caution, Gordon Roberts, counsel for Barrick, stated at a deposition that the June 11 letter "may come within the purview of that
[question]" when a witness was asked whether the Stock Purchase
Agreement

reflected

the

entire

agreement

between

Barrick

Texaco with respect to the acquisition of the Mercur Mine.

and
See

Deposition of Stephen Dattels, p. 301 (a copy of the relevant
page

is included

in Appendix

as Item " 6 " ) .

Mr. Roberts

then

agreed to, and did furnish the foundational basis for Gold Standard to bring the motion to compel before the district court.
-13-

As stated earlier, the document is primarily a retainer
agreement.

The June 11 letter was not directed at effectuating

the June 1985 sale of the company
Rather, the

terms of

the

letter

that Owned the Mercur Mine.
are conditional

and

focus on

aspects of an attorney-client relationship in the event that Gold
Standard initiated litigation.
CONCLUSION
As
inspection,

this
the

Court

ruling

will
of

see

the

by virtue

Third

of

Digtrict

its in
Court

camera

that

the

June 11, 1985 letter was protected under the attorney-client and
work product privileges was well founded.

For the reasons set

forth above, respondents Barrick/Getty respectfully request that
this

Court

affirm

the

district

court's

Order

denying

Standard's Motion to Compel.
SUBMITTED this J>

da

Y

of

January, 1990.

GOraONL. R O B B R T S ^ / ^
FRANCIS M. WIRSTROM *
JOHN B. WILSON
J. MICHAEL BAI|LEY
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Respondents
American Barlrick Resources
Corporation and Barrick
Resources (U^A), Inc.
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Gold

G. CROCKETT
ST}
ROBERT S . CLARK
JILL N. PARRISH
BRIAN J. ROMRIELL
of and for
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT &
WADDOUPS
Attorneys for Respondents
Texaco Inc., Getty Oil
Company and Getty Mining
Company
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that
four

(4)

true

and

RESPONDENTS AMERICAN
RESOURCES

correct
BARRICK

I caused to be hand-delivered,

copies

of

the

foregoing

RESOURCES CORPORATION

BRIEF

OF

AND BARRICK

(USA) INC., TEXACO INC., GETTY OIL COMPANY AND GETTY

MINING COMPANY

to the

following

on this ±

day of January,

1990:
James S. Lowrie
Christopher L. Burton
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
170 South Main, #1500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

314:121889A
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